We consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests ("clubs") compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, recognition may be expressed by these other individuals joining a club, or choosing one club to admire. Clubs compete by providing a public good. Competition between clubs increases the public good provision level, and a sufficiently strong competition effect may even lead to overprovision. The model thus limits the argument for subsidies to the private providers of public goods. We discuss implications of the model for open-source software projects, university fundraising and infrastructure competition between cities.
Introduction
One of the fundamental results of public economics is that public goods are underprovided relative to the social optimum, if the provision decision is not centralized, but rather left to the voluntary contributions of economic agents. This market failure explains why most public goods are state provided.
Yet, there are several areas in which the private provision of public goods has been remarkably successful. Linux and Latex, Firefox and Thunderbird are just some examples of the success of open-source software projects, where the program code is essentially a public good provided by volunteers. A related example is the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, in which thousands of contributors cooperate to provide an information source of remarkably high quality.
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While these projects are prime examples of the successful private provision of public goods, existing economic models of the private provision of public goods do not appear to match these applications very well. In particular, in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) , economic agents are motivated to contribute to the public good by the fact that they also consume it and benefit from a higher provision level.
2 This incentive is, of course, insufficient from a social point of view, as it ignores the positive externalities imposed on other players, but it at least provides some motivation for contributors.
However, this consideration cannot explain at all why people donate time to Wikipedia: An individual who can write an article on a subject does not need that article for himself and consequently the existence of this public good should not affect his utility at all. Therefore, something else must motivate Wikipedia contributors. Similarly, contributors to Latex or Linux open source software projects could choose just to write the extension packages that are useful to them without making them available as public goods. Posting packages requires writing considerable documentation (in order that other people can use the package and possibly modify it later on), so choosing to make one's own package a public good involves considerable effort cost while not improving the "quality" of the package for the purpose of the author's own consumption.
Moreover, in contrast to the classical argument that public goods are underprovided if they are supplied by individuals rather than the government, it is not clear that this is the case in some of the open source cases 1 For example, a recent study by the science journal Nature of 42 articles in Wikipedia and (the commercial leader) Encyclopedia Britannica found that the number of factual mistakes was essentially the same for both sources. See Giles (2005) .
2 Other models of private provision of public goods are reviewed in the next subsection.
mentioned above. For example, consider the documents preparation system of Latex, which consists of a core system that compiles ASCII texts into nice-looking documents, and a large number of "packages", written by individual contributors as add-ons for specific tasks. For certain tasks, I would argue that the number of distinct packages available outnumbers the socially optimal quantity. For example, the core Latex contains already a very versatile framework for formatting letters (letter.cls). However, in addition, there exist at least seven packages supplied by individuals that feature different variations for letters.
3 Each of these packages contains a manual in which the authors usually first describe in detail why they wrote their package.
We argue that the main motivation for the public good contributors in the examples above (and in many other cases) is that they enjoy that other people use "their" work or are attracted to the subjects that the original contributors find attractive. Perens (2005) suggests that free-riding behavior is not a major problem for open-source software projects:
4 "All Open Source users start out as free-riders. They download and try the software, and perhaps deploy it, and do not generally consider contributing to that software's development until they are already using it and desire an additional feature. [. . . ] Volunteers derive emotional fulfillment from having users for their software, just as artists derive fulfillment from having others appreciate their paintings. For volunteers, users provide an intangible benefit which the volunteer desires. Thus, those users should not be considered free-riders."
In the Wikipedia example, contributors may enjoy other people becoming better informed on a subject that is close to the heart of the contributor. Similar effects apply in other fields. Many church members engage in activities with the objective of attracting new believers to their creed. Similarly, professors in, say, microeconomics, may enjoy it if a gifted graduate student chooses to write his thesis in microeconomics, rather than going over to the dark side and specialize in macro or labor economics; and professors in those other fields are said to harbor analogous feelings.
In our model, public good providers are organized in "clubs". 5 There are two types of individuals, (old) club members and (new) potential members. Clubs provide a public good for their old members and for those individu-3 The letter packages I found are postcards, akletter, lettre, g-brief, dinbrief, fribrief, newlfm.
4 Bruce Perens is a prominent figure in the open source movement. He is a former Debian GNU/Linux Project Leader and co-founder of the Open Source Initiative.
5 In some examples above, clubs may contain only one member each. This is particularly the case when the ultimate reason for public good provision is the desire to become "famous". However, in other applications, several members have joint interests.
als from the set of potential new members who decide to join a particular club. (When we call the action of the new players "joining", we have the religious or graduate student example above in mind; in the research or open source examples, "joining" should be thought of as a user or reader using the author's work and thus "paying his respect".)
Potential new members are attracted to clubs through the quality of public goods that the clubs provide, respectively. While an old member may or may not enjoy the public good by itself, he (also) receives utility when new players choose to join his club. We analyze the equilibrium in two scenarios: First, when individual club members decide how much to contribute to the public good; and second, when clubs are centralized and the contribution decision is made to maximize the utility of old club members. Equilibrium contributions are higher in the second scenario, and may be higher than socially optimal in both scenarios.
Related literature
The existing literature analyzing the private provision of public goods is divided into four branches. In one branch, pioneered by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) , individuals are motivated to contribute because they are consumers of the public good. In contrast, as explained above, individuals in our model are not (only) motivated to contribute in their role as consumers of the public good, but (also) because they aim for recognition by an audience.
Second, individuals may contribute to public goods because they are altruistic. Becker (1974) analyzes a model in which the "head of household" has the utility of other "household members" as arguments in his utility function. This framework is most plausible as a model of intrafamily behavior, while it might be a stretch to apply it to some of the examples above.
6 Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1990 ) develops the third branch in which individuals are motivated to contribute by "impure altruism". While they do not necessarily care about the utility level that other individuals reach, they directly enjoy a "warm glow" when they give: The contribution amount of an individual is an argument of his utility function. In all three types of models covered 6 A paper related to both the first and second approach, and to our paper in that it models competition between different public good providers, is Peters and Siow (2002) who study premarital parental investments in children's wealth. In their model, parents care about their own children's utility. Spousal wealth is a public good in marriage, and more wealthy children can marry better spouses (spouse quality also affects utility). Like club members in our model, parents compete through providing a public good, and, as in our model, this competition with other families increases the equilibrium provision of the public good. so far, all players contribute to the same public good and enjoy it (or are at most indifferent), if other players increase their contribution level. In this sense, different players don't compete with each other, as they do in our model. As a consequence, a player's optimal contribution level decreases, if the contribution level of other individuals increases. In contrast, players in our model create positive externalities for the audience they are trying to attract, but negative externalities on members of other clubs who compete for the same audience. Also, increased competition in our model (say, an increase in the number of clubs) may well lead to a a higher provision level by each club.
A fourth branch, which is probably most closely related to our paper, was pioneered by Glazer and Konrad (1996) . In their model, players care about how wealthy they are perceived by other individuals, and use observable charity contributions to signal their wealth. This model therefore, like ours, builds on the notion that individuals contribute to public goods in order to impress their fellow citizens. However, contributors do not directly compete with each other in Glazer and Konrad, in the sense that the recognition that an individual gets who gives at least the equilibrium threshold contribution is not diminished, if there are also other individuals who contribute to charity. Also, players contribute to a single public good in Glazer and Konrad, while in our model, individuals in the same club cooperate through their contributions, while those in different clubs compete with each other.
Glazer and Konrad also show that a tax on contributions (rather than the subsidy commonly extended by the tax code through the deductibility of charitable donations) is beneficial in order to reduce signaling.
7 This corresponds to our result that, if competition between clubs is sufficiently intense, the level of public good supplied may be excessive.
More peripherally, the present paper is also related to the literature on clubs and local public goods.
8 A literature starting with Buchanan (1965) studies the formation of clubs in a framework in which players care about the number or identity of other club members. The main trade-off concerning club size is that adding members allows more cost sharing, but reduces the service quality experienced by all users. In the literature on local public goods, pioneered by Tiebout (1956) , individuals "vote with their feet" to self-select into one of many localities, and public good provision in each locality is determined by majority voting. Since sorting leads to (relatively) homogenous communities, majority voting implements (approximately) efficient levels of public good provision. Our paper shares with this literature 7 A similar result in a related framework is also derived in Blumkin and Sadka (2006) . 8 See Scotchmer (2002) for a review of this literature.
the concept of free mobility, at least for potential new members.
The model
Each of n different clubs has initially M members. Furthermore, there are P potential new members who can choose which club to join. To attract new members, and possibly for their own consumption, clubs or club members provide a public good G, which is produced from individual member contributions (e, for effort). Specifically, we assume that club j's public good satisfies
where e i j is the contribution of the ith member of club j, which costs that member c(e i j ). We assume that the cost function satisfies c (0) = 0 and c (x) > 0 for all x.
Each club, and each potential new member, has a location on a circle with unit circumference. If potential new member k joins club j, he receives a utility of
where x k is the location of individual k, X j is the location of club j, so that ||x k − X j || is the distance between x k and X j , 9 and τ is a "transportation cost" parameter. Intuitively, the clubs produce differentiated goods, and the distance between a club and a potential new member measures the exante affinity of such a match (disregarding the quality of the public good provided). For example, consider different religious congregations competing with each other for new members. Each congregation is characterized by a fixed doctrine, which is likely to appeal differently to different potential new members, and by the level of community activities of the congregation, i.e., the public good G j in the language of our model. Each potential new member has an outside utility level of zero and either joins the club that provides him with the highest positive utility, or remains outside, if no club provides a positive utility.
Clubs are spaced equidistantly on the circle, so that X 1 = 0, X 2 = 1/n, . . . , X n = (n−1)/n. Each of the P new individuals' location is independently drawn from a uniform distribution on the circle. While each individual knows the realization of his own location, clubs know only the distribution from which they are drawn.
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The parameter A allows us to distinguish cases in which the potential new members get a significant utility from joining some club from situations in which they might not join any club at all. (For example, a graduate student has to write a thesis in some field, unless he exits the program; in this case, A is large.) Varying A allows us to distinguish the effect on public good provision that arises from a preference for attracting new members alone, on the one hand, from the effect of competition between different clubs on the other hand.
Old club members receive utility from the level of the public good provided by their own club and from the number of new members who join their club, P j . Specifically, the utility of member i of club j is
where α∈ [0, 1] measures the weight that old members place directly on the public good supply, while (1 −α) is the weight of the objective of attracting new members. The linear form is chosen only for simplification, and all results would go through with a utility function u(G, P ) that is concave.
Interpretation The model fits best the church and graduate student examples from the introduction, because potential new members join (at most) one of the existing clubs. In other applications where public good providers crave for recognition (like the open source software example, artists, sports teams), audience members are in principle not limited to using only one OSS program, admiring only one artist, or to be a fan of only one club. However, empirical observation suggests that most people in the audience choose to engage in only a very limited number of such activities. For example, consider the packages for writing letters in Latex mentioned in the introduction. While it is, in principle, possible for a single user to use all of these packages, I believe that it would be highly unusual for any user to use more than one of these packages, because each package contains its own set of different special commands. Thus, there is effectively a fixed cost a user 10 Assuming that clubs know the exact location of potential new members would be less realistic. Also, uncertainty over individual locations "smoothes" the model. If individual locations were known, then a club would have a very strong incentive to provide more of the public good if a potential new member is (almost) indifferent between the club and one of its competitors, and the same is, of course, true for the competing club. As a consequence, a model with known individual locations would have the disadvantage that no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
has to pay every time he learns how to use a new package, and few users are willing to duplicate these costs for packages that perform very similar tasks. Hence, providers compete with each other in these applications, too, and the general economic effects identified in the next section apply to these examples as well.
In our model, effort increases the quality of the public good G, but does not reduce the cost of distance. The difference is that an increase in G increases all club members' utilities symmetrically. If effort reduced the cost of distance, then potential new members who are farther away benefit more than those whose distance is small. For example, if an open source software project like Ubuntu develops a new and more comfortable installation procedure, then this feature would likely benefit "marginal" users more than more tech-savvy users (who are, in terms of our model, already "closer" to the location of the project). Alternatively, there may also be instances in which a new feature benefits close users more than marginal ones. Our assumption that improvements benefit each potential user, as well as old members, symmetrically, is an intermediate case and made for ease of presentation.
We assume that, if there are P j new members, the utility of old members increases by (1 −α)P j . This utility increase can have two interpretations. First, "old members" may get a direct payoff, for example, from the admiration expressed by "new members". For example, when the project is writing a scientific paper, many authors directly enjoy it if other researchers read (and cite) their work.
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The second interpretation is one where the payoff is an indirect utility arising from a dynamic version of the model. Suppose that, in the next period, this period's "new members" become regular members who contribute to the success of the club in the same way as previous old members (say, either by direct contributions, or by financially supporting the club through membership fees). The number of members in the second period increases the club's public good production and thus the utility of initial old members. In this context, (1 −α)P j can be interpreted as the indirect utility arising from such dynamic effects.
Our model does not contain a pricing decision for firms. While this may be restrictive in some applications, there are many others for which pricing (i.e., either taxing new members, or subsidizing them) would not appear a reasonable choice for the public good providers. In the open source applications, contributions are often based on software that specifies in its license that any modifications must be provided for free. Similarly, while many scientists enjoy if their papers are read or they are invited to give a seminar at another university, paying the audience so that they read one's papers or invite one for a seminar would be very unusual. Thus, there are applications for which monetary transfers are not a feasible instrument for the providers of public goods.
Equilibrium
We look at two scenarios for how the public good is provided. In the first one, each old member individually decides how much effort to contribute. In the second one, members in a club behave cooperatively; one can think of a club president who maximizes the utility of the initial club members, or club members who interact repeatedly and can "punish" other club members who play non-cooperatively. We compare the equilibrium in both scenarios with the social optimum.
In what follows, we look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all old members contribute the same amount to their club's public good. Consequently, in equilibrium, the amount of public good provided is the same for all clubs.
Decision to join a club. We first analyze the decision of a potential new member located at x ∈ [0, 1/n] which club, if any, to join. We postpone the discussion of the case of low A till later and consider here the case that all types of potential new members join clubs in equilibrium. The individual is indifferent between clubs 1 and 2 (located at 0 and 1/n, respectively), if A+βG 1 −τx = A+βG 2 −τ 1 n − x , which we can solve for x = 1 2n
. Similarly, one can compute the indifferent individual located between clubs n and 1. Multiplying the length of club 1's interval with P (and lettinḡ G = (G 2 + G n )/2 denote the average provision by club 1's neighbors), the expected number of people who join club 1 is
Thus, whenever club 1 does not cover the whole market (i.e., there are some locations such that individuals located there would join another club), then the effect of an increase in G 1 on the expected number of new members is
Social optimum. Consider a social planner who maximizes the aggregate sum of utilities of all individuals, by choosing each old member's level of effort e. It is clear that the convexity of the cost function implies that the cheapest way to produce a given level of total effort in a club is to distribute the effort symmetrically over all old club members. In addition, we suppose here that the social planner chooses a symmetric solution in which all clubs provide the same level of public good, and thus each club attracts, in expectation, the same number of new members. In the appendix, we show that such a symmetric allocation is in fact optimal, provided that βis sufficiently small or τ is sufficiently large. The social planner's problem is
There are n·M old members, and if each of them provides effort e, each club produces G = Me and attracts, in expectation, P/n new members, so that each old member receives utility αMe + (1 −α) P n − c(e). In expectation, each of the P new members is a distance 1/4n away from the club he joins, so new members on average receive utility A +βMe − τ 4n
. Taking the first-order condition with respect to e, and canceling M, yields nM α − nc (e) +βP = 0,
Since the second derivative is −nc (e) < 0, the first-order condition is necessary and sufficient for a maximum of the social planner's problem. Rearranging (7) slightly, we get
The left-hand side consists of the social benefit of a marginal increase of one old member's effort by de: Each of the M club members benefits by αde; furthermore, each of the (on average) P/n new members benefits by βde. This marginal social benefit of effort must be equal to the marginal cost of effort on the right hand side. Note that the effect of public good provision on the joining decision of potential new members does not enter the optimal rule of the social planner. The reason is that any rearrangement of new members does not change the sum of the utilities of old members.
Public good provision by individual members. Consider now a situation in which each old club member decides individually how much of the public good to contribute. This is, for example, a reasonable model of an open source software project in which no central authority could force contributors to contribute more than they do voluntarily.
Member i of club j maximizes
. (9) Taking the derivative with respect to e i j yields
Comparing (10) with (8) yields that the equilibrium level of effort is higher than the socially optimal level if
and lower than socially optimal if the inequality is reversed. A decrease of αor τ, or an increase of n make it more likely that (11) is satisfied. A low αmeans that individuals care primarily about attracting new members. An increase in the number of competing clubs, n, or a decrease in τ (making clubs better substitutes for new members) both intensify competition between clubs. For example, if α= 0, the condition for old members to provide too much of the public good boils down to τ < n. Intuitively, overprovision of public goods is possible, because each old member exerts both a positive externality (on his fellow club members and on entrants into his club) and a negative externality (on members of other clubs, by "stealing" new members). Depending on parameters, either effect can dominate. If α= 1, (11) cannot hold, so that the model then delivers the standard underprovision result, because each member disregards the effect of his effort on the public good consumption of both the M − 1 other old members and the expected P/n new members.
Centralized provision of public goods. Consider now a situation where the ties within a club are strong enough to support a cooperative effort allocation in which all club members choose their effort level so as to maximize the utility of (old) club members. This may be a reasonable assumption for churches deciding on missionary activity and possibly for groups in economics departments trying to attract graduate students to their field. In this scenario, the club maximizes
Taking the derivative with respect to e, and canceling M, yields
Comparing (13) with (10), it is clear that more of the public good is provided when the provision decision is made centrally for the club than when members decide individually. Comparing (13) with (8), effort is overprovided relative to the social optimum whenever
Again, the public good is more likely to be overprovided the higher is n, and the lower are τ and α(i.e., the more intense and important is competition for new members). In addition, a higher M makes overprovision more likely, because the positive externality on fellow club members is now completely internalized while the negative externality on members of other clubs continues to be ignored. Note that (14) is independent of β, as both the neglected positive and negative externalities are linear in β. If the club also internalizes the utility of new members, then overprovision of the public good is guaranteed, because all positive externalities are internalized, while a negative externality exists between different clubs. We now summarize the main results. Proposition 1.
1. If individual club members decide on how much public good to supply, then the equilibrium provision level is higher than socially optimal if inequality (11) holds, and lower than socially optimal if the reverse inequality holds.
2. If the public good provision decision is centralized within each club, then the equilibrium provision level is higher than in the case of individual provision, and higher than socially optimal if inequality (14) holds, and lower than socially optimal if the reverse inequality holds. ) who is just indifferent between joining club 1 and not joining any club: A+βG 1 −τx = 0. Since all individuals located closer to 0 than this individual join club 1, the expected number of new club 1 members is
The social optimization problem is
(15) Here, the first term is the utility of old club members, and the second term is the utility of new members.
12 In contrast, if the provision decision is centralized within each club, the club maximizes
It is immediate from comparing (15) and (16) that the level provided by the clubs is less than the socially optimal level. Furthermore, when the provision decision is made by individual club members, the level supplied is even lower than in the case of centralized provision. Hence we have Proposition 2. If, in equilibrium, no potential new member type exists that is indifferent between two clubs, then the equilibrium public good provision level is lower than socially optimal. This is true even when the provision decision is centrally coordinated by each club.
The intuitive reason for this result is simple: If clubs effectively do not compete with each other for new members, then they do not impose negative externalities on each other. Rather, the only externality present in this situation is the standard one, neglecting the positive effect public goods have on potential new members (and other old club members, if the provision decision is made by individual members). Proposition 2 therefore shows that the driving force behind any overprovision result in this paper is not the assumption that old members have a preference for attracting new members per se, but rather the combination: Clubs care about new members and compete for them with other clubs.
In practice, the existence of some people who do not join any club should not necessarily be interpreted as clubs not competing with each other, as potential new members in reality may also differ in their A (and other parameters). In this case, some individuals with low A may choose not to join any club, while clubs still compete for new members with high A, and the same qualitative results as in the basic model apply.
Crowding out. When public goods are also provided by the state, then the equilibrium provision level by private parties decreases in most models of the private provision of public goods. Since the utility from the public good is linear in our model, this does not happen in our basic model, but we can easily create such an effect by assuming a concave utility function. Specifically, suppose that the utility of member i of club j is αV S+e
where V (·) is an increasing and concave function, and S is the amount of public good directly supplied by the state in each club. Note that S in the second term cancels, as the state supply is uniform across all clubs and therefore leaves their competition for new members unaffected. Taking the derivative with respect to e i j yields
so that de
Clearly, individual members reduce their public good provision if the state increases it, the usual crowding out effect. More interestingly, the absolute value of
is increasing in α, and is 0 as α= 0. Hence, if old members are strongly motivated to contribute in order to attract new members (i.e., α is low), then additional state supply of the public good leads to a very low crowding out effect.
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Direct state provision vs. prizes. Suppose that the equilibrium public good provision level is below the socially optimal level, and consider a social planner who is interested only in increasing the equilibrium level of public good provided. Assume further that there are two alternative policies that cost the same amount of money, so the question is simply which one is more successful in raising equilibrium public good supply: In the first scenario, the social planner produces an amount ∆ 0 of the public good in each club and then individuals decide how much to contribute additionally. Another way of thinking about ∆ 0 is that the social planner supports all providers in a way that shifts their cost function to c(e −∆ 0 ). For example, the social planner could give all researchers a course off their teaching load, which allows them to do more research.
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In the second scenario, the social planner promises to distribute a "prize" of size Π 0 to one of the clubs, and the probability that a club is awarded the prize is proportional to the number of new members. The idea behind the distribution of a prize is that the social planner uses the decisions of the potential new members to judge the quality of the public good provision of the different clubs. This is particularly useful for providing incentives when the social planner cannot directly observe the quality of the public goods provided by the different clubs. In that case, it would not be possible for the social planner to pay the clubs directly for providing more of their respective public goods.
We assume that the provision decision in each club is centralized and, for tractability, we assume that each club has a quadratic cost function:
where ∆ is the amount of public good provided directly by the social planner, Πisthe prize money, and the term in square brackets is the probability that the club wins the prize.
13 Clearly, the argument in this section does not relie on the utility from new members being linear. As S cancels out from the second term in (17), any concave rather than linear form for the utility from new members would produce the same result.
14 Note that it is plausible that, the more clubs there are and therefore, the more different public goods there are, the less ∆ 0 can be produced in each club for a fixed amount of money; however, for now, we just take ∆ 0 as exogenous and will return to this issue below.
The first scenario, direct provision, corresponds to ∆ = ∆ 0 ,Π=0; and the second, prize, scenario corresponds to ∆ = 0, Π = Π 0 . Differentiating (20) yields
Solving for e, we get
Hence, the equilibrium provision level in the first scenario where the planner directly provides ∆ = ∆ 0 , but no prize, is
In the second (prize) scenario, the public good is only provided by the clubs and equal to
The terms in (23) and (24) are equal when
If ∆ 0 is larger than the critical value ∆ * 0 , then it is optimal for the social planner to provide the public good directly, and if ∆ 0 is smaller, then it is optimal to donate the prize.
Intuitively, the critical level of directly supplied public good increases with the size of the prize that could be promised alternatively, and decreases with k and τ, because both of these parameters determine how strong the clubs increase their public good supply as a response to the prize money they could win. Perhaps surprisingly, the critical level does not depend on any of the following: The number of clubs n, the number of potential new members P , and the parameter αof the utility function. Independence of αmeans that, whether the club members are intrinsically motivated by their own public good consumption or by the prospect of attracting new members, does not matter for whether direct provision or the donation of prizes is more effective for the social planner to bring about an increase in the public good level.
Note that an increase in n does not reduce the effectiveness of a given prize to motivate clubs. While a higher n decreases the likelihood of winning for each club, the marginal effect of effort on that probability stays the same, independent of n. On the other hand, it appears reasonable that the amount ∆ 0 of the public goods that can be produced by the social planner for the same amount of money decreases, when n increases. If so, then the more different clubs there are, the more likely it is that a prize is the better instrument for increasing public good supply.
Applications
Implications for university fundraising. Our model has some interesting, and potentially testable, implications for university fundraising. Think of the players as a (relatively small) number of rich alumni of the same school, who may choose to endow different departments or programs in the university with their money.
Consider first a model following Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) in which contributors are motivated by their role as consumers of the public goods that the university provides. Suppose that the university has an endowment fund that is invested in the capital market. If the value of the endowment increases (say, through successful speculation), the alumni should optimally give less money, because the school is now able to use the additional funds gained on the capital market to finance more public good provision, which decreases the marginal value of the public good. This is the crowding out argument discussed in Section 4.1 above. As we have seen there, this crowding out argument applies much less (or not at all) in our model, where contributors are instead motivated by their desire to, say, impress their former classmates. In our model, fundraising would be more or less independent of the stock market success of the endowment fund.
This also implies that the university leadership in a model with a crowding out problem would have a stronger incentive to spend an endowment relatively quickly (in order to encourage further contributions by donors), while, in our model, they can keep accumulating money in the endowment fund without risking a negative effect on fundraising.
Another prediction that distinguishes between the models is related to the effects of other donors contributing more. Suppose that, for some donors, the marginal cost of contributing decreases. If contributors are motivated through their role as consumers, this should decrease the contribution of donors whose marginal cost has not changed. In contrast, in our model, the first order conditions (whether (10) or (13)) are independent of the level¯G of the neighboring clubs, and hence we should expect no change in the contribution behavior of those individuals whose marginal cost of contribution has not changed.
In fact, a slight asymmetric variation may easily generate the result that a player's contributions increase when there is increased competition by other donors. For simplicity, let α= 0, i.e., contributors are only interested in attracting the approval of the audience. Instead of (2) describing the utility of prospective new members, suppose that the utility of potential new member k from club j is
i.e. different alumni donors are differentiated also by different levels of A. Suppose that, in the initial situation, the cost of contribution is high for everyone and old donor 1 has such an advantage (A 1 >> A j , for all j > 1) that nobody contributes and all audience members admire donor 1 in the initial equilibrium. Suppose now that the cost of contribution decreases, possibly only for some other donors, who will increase their contribution. Thus, donor 1 now faces effective competition, and, as a consequence, will also increase his contribution. Thus, our model framework is compatible with contributions of different donors being strategic complements, while they are strategic substitutes if contributors are entirely consumption-motivated.
Competing through infrastructure. In the location decisions of firms and individuals, the "quality of life" in a particular city often plays a very important role. Conversely, cities often try actively to influence these decisions by providing or subsidizing public goods like sports teams, symphony orchestras or museums, in order to attract businesses or highly-skilled individuals to their city. For example, when a city considers whether to build a new sports stadium, an often used argument is that this will attract new businesses, providing significant indirect economic benefits. Note, however, that these benefits for the city often correspond to losses of a similar size for another city in which those firms would locate in the absence of a new stadium. Following the local public goods literature pioneered by Tiebout (1956) , assume that each city chooses its provision of public goods internalizing the benefits of its current residents from the public good (so that we are in the centralized provision scenario of the model). From equation (14), we know that overprovision relative to the social optimum becomes more likely if the weight (1−α) attached to attracting new businesses is high. (In principle, we can draw some conclusions about the size of αfrom the value that is attached to attracting new businesses in the cost-benefit analysis of a project.)
Overprovision also becomes more likely if the mobility of firms increases (i.e., a lower τ). For example, this might be the case if new information technology like the internet allows firms to locate farther away from their customers, or if more firms are "knowledge-based" (i.e., don't have to transfer large production facilities if they want to change their location). In this context, it is interesting to note that there was a large increase in stadium construction in the 1990es relative to the previous decades. While there might be also different reasons for this phenomenon, it is at least consistent with our model.
If cities compete fiercely against each other to attract businesses through their public good provision, then our model implies that the state or federal government should not subsidize such projects, but rather tax or discourage them. This is particularly true if a large portion of the benefit attributed to the project relates to this motivation.
Also note that competing for businesses through public good provision has the potential of creating worse welfare effects than competing through direct subsidies paid for firms choosing their location: Suppose, for simplicity, that α= 0 (i.e., the public good has no value per se for the cities' original inhabitants). If firms are sufficiently flexible (τ is low), then the public good is overprovided in our model, which means intuitively that the last unit of the public good (costing one dollar to the city's inhabitants) is valued at less than a dollar by the firms.
Alternatively, consider what happens if cities compete by offering direct subsidies to firms. Effectively, this is a Salop (1979) oligopoly model with negative "production costs" (as cities place a positive value when firms locate there), and the equilibrium subsidy paid is equal to the cities' valuation of a firm minus the "transportation cost" to the next city. Note that this subsidy is just a transfer from cities to firms, and hence does not affect social welfare.
While our model provides some useful insights into the problem of competing through infrastructure, there are some limitations, because some key features of infrastructure competition are missing from our model. In particular, in our model, cities cannot set user fees (or pay direct subsidies), but are constrained to use infrastructure as their only instrument to compete. We also do not model how the infrastructure investments affect property values.
There is an extensive literature that incorporates some of these features. For example, Hohaus, Konrad, and Thum (1994) develop a model in which two horizontally differentiated communities compete by choosing a location for their public good. Since land values are determined by the utility difference of the marginal inhabitant, both communities have a socially excessive incentive to cater to the taste of marginal inhabitants in order to increase property values. In Justman, Thisse, and von Ypersele (2002) , two regions compete for firms ex-ante through the quality of their infrastructure, as well as, at a later stage, through direct subsidies (or taxes). They show that the regions have a strong incentive to differentiate in terms of infrastructure in order to alleviate the price competition in the second stage. Jayet and Paty (2006) develop a model in which several cities compete to attract one firm with unknown geographical preferences. Cities can choose whether or not to develop a suitable site, and in a second stage set a tax or subsidy, and the firm chooses in which of the developed sites to locate. In equilibrium, cities engage in excessive infrastructure competition, developing more sites than needed by the firm.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of public good provision by clubs in which public good providers are motivated by the hope of gaining the respect of their audience (or making audience members join their club). This incentive has the potential of explaining some important cases in which public goods are privately provided. Competition for new members (or audience approval) generates an additional, negative externality between different clubs. It is possible that this negative externality outweighs the standard positive one, in which case the public good supply by private providers can be higher than socially optimal. The model thus limits the argument for providing subsidies to the private providers of public goods. As we show, crowding out of private contributions by state provision of the public good is less of a problem in our framework, because it does not affect the incentive of clubs to compete with each other. We discuss implications of the model for university fundraising and infrastructure competition between cities.
There are several directions in which the model can be expanded, both empirically and theoretically. In Section 4.2, we have already developed some testable implications of the model related to university fundraising and competition between cities, but an empirical analysis using our framework should also be possible in other areas, such as the provision of open source software.
Some theoretical extensions are as follows. First, the number of clubs in the model is exogenous, while there may be applications in which the social planner can influence the number of clubs competing with each other.
choice between different types of public goods that differ in their effectivity of attracting recognition. Contributors may also care not primarily about the number of people who admire them, but also about their identity. Both effects may generate distortions for the type of public good offered. For example, there are Latex language support packages for Coptic, Interlingua, Latin, Icelandic and Uppersorbian (among others). There is probably a very small set of Latex users in need of such language support, so that the existence of such packages is quite remarkable. However, these communities are also likely to be very connected, and the respective contributors may care strongly about these users. In contrast, solutions to some "general interest" problems (such as handling of tables or presentation slides) are or were relatively underprovided in the Latex community.
Finally, an interesting question is the optimal organization of open source software projects in our framework. Under which conditions should there be a centralized control authority that determines which contributions to accept? For example, Linux has a centralized control authority that determines which new developments are incorporated into the standard release of the program. In contrast, in Latex, contributors are more or less free to post any extension package they have developed, and users choose which one to use.
Appendix
Here, we derive conditions that guarantee that a social planner chooses a symmetric solution (as assumed in the text), rather than choosing asymmetric effort allocations such that, say, all potential new members join one particular club.
By the convexity of the cost function, for any fixed total amount of effort in a club, the cheapest way to produce this total is to allocate it equally to all club members. Thus, without loss of generality, let e i denote the effort of each club member in club i. Let [x i−1 , x i ] is the interval of individuals who join club i. For example, if all individuals join the same club i, then x i−1 = 0 and x i = 1. If, instead, club i's range does not cover the whole circle, then x i−1 and x i are given by those individuals who are indifferent between joining club i and some other club (which, however, does not necessarily have to be club i's neighbor). Clearly, the effort vector e determines the vector of cutoffs x.
Also note that, if there is an individual indifferent between clubs i and j > i (as top choices of this individual), then x i is given by
Consequently, A +βMe i − τ x − i − 1 n dx.
The first term is the direct utility of old club members, the second term is the utility of old club members from new members (which is constant in e, as the total number of new members in all clubs together is fixed), and the third term is the direct utility of new members. If more than one club is active, then, without loss of generality, let club i be active and let clubs j < i and j > i be its relevant neighbors (i.e., there is a location x i where (27) holds with equality etc.). Differentiating only the third term with respect to e i yields PβM(x i − x i−1 ) + P dx i de i ×
since the second and the third term on the left-hand side drop out. Intuitively, a marginal increase of e i has a direct effect (all new members who are already in club i are better off), and an indirect effect: Some new members switch to club i; however, since these marginal members are (almost) indifferent between club i and their next best alternative, this effect does not increase welfare (to a first order approximation). Also note that, if only club i is active (i.e., x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1), then the derivative takes the same value, because 
The second derivative with respect to e i is ∂ 2 SP ∂e (31) and (32), we can form the Hessian matrix of the social planner's problem. Clearly, if βis small or τ is large, the off-diagonal elements of the Hessian are very small, while the diagonal elements go to −c which is negative and bounded away from 0. Thus, if βis sufficiently small or τ is sufficiently large, the Hessian is negative definite and thus, the objective function of the social planner is strictly concave.
Clearly, if the objective function is strictly concave and symmetric, then the solution is interior and symmetric.
